Intellectuals and Democratization, 1905–1912 and 1989–1996 by Kurzman, Charles & Leahey, Erin
AJS 109 Number 4 (January 2004): 937-86 937





University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Erin Leahey
University of Arizona
This article bridges the gap in studies of the social bases of democ-
ratization between qualitative studies focused on social groups and
quantitative studies focused on national characteristics. Qualitative
historical evidence suggests the importance of classes—in particular,
the emerging class of intellectuals—in the wave of democratizations
in the decade before World War I. Quantitative cross-national data
on a more recent wave of democratizations, from 1989 to 1996,
confirm these findings. Models using direct maximum-likelihood es-
timation find that the ratio of adults with higher education has a
significant positive effect on change in democracy levels, as mea-
sured by two longitudinal scales (Polity IV and Polyarchy). Proxies
for the working class and the middle class—candidates proposed in
previous studies as the social basis of democratization—also have
significant effects.
The study of the social bases of democratization has long been split in
two: a qualitative case-oriented tradition that takes account of historical
process and a quantitative tradition that maximizes sample size to address
case-selection biases (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, pp.
12–39). We propose that these two traditions differ also in their substantive
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focus: the qualitative studies focus largely on the formation and political
positions of social groups, while the quantitative studies focus largely on
characteristics of countries as a whole. This article attempts to bridge
these two gaps through the study of two waves of democratization, one
in the early part of the 20th century and one in the latter part.
This article bridges the methodological gap by combining qualitative-
historical and quantitative approaches. For the early 20th century, we
rely primarily on the former, as few indicators of interest are available
in systematic cross-national format for that period and, further, too few
nondemocratic countries were independent at that high-water mark of
colonial conquest to run multivariate analyses. For the late 20th century,
we rely primarily on quantitative methods, in an attempt to include the
entire population of nondemocratic countries. For each period, we intro-
duce the primary analysis with suggestive findings using the opposite
method.
The article bridges the substantive gap by combining national and class
factors in the quantitative analysis. We collect indicators of the classes
identified in the qualitative-historical literature on democratization (bour-
geoisie, middle class, and working class) and attempt to adjudicate their
influence relative to national-level variables more commonly used in the
quantitative literature, such as wealth, religion, and colonial heritage.
In addition, the article proposes a new candidate for the social basis
of democratization: the modern “class” of intellectuals. We recognize that
many movements, including non- and antidemocratic ones, involve in-
tellectuals. This was one of the founding insights of the sociology of in-
tellectuals, as expressed by Karl Mannheim in the 1920s: “Unattached
intellectuals are to be found in the course of history in all camps” (Mann-
heim [1929] 1985, p. 158). Yet Mannheim was writing at a distinctive
moment in the history of intellectuals (Kurzman and Owens 2002), a
period of “intense spiritual self-criticism” among “demoralized” intellec-
tuals (Michels 1932, pp. 123–24). Prior to World War I, by contrast, the
intellectual identity was a matter of pride and the basis of collective
mobilization, as discussed below. This identity was closely associated with
a particular form of political activism: democratization movements.
We argue here that intellectuals were important for democratization in
two waves of democratic transitions, both sparked by dramatic changes
in Russia (Kurzman 1998b). Ricocheting around the globe for approxi-
mately eight years each (1905–12 and 1989–96), these waves represent
bookends of democratization in the 20th century. We find that intellectuals
provided hegemonic leadership and organizational infrastructure for the
democracy movements of the early 20th century. We find also that the
size of a country’s intellectual “class” (as measured by the prevalence of
higher education among adults in 1988) is significantly correlated with
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the likelihood of democratization in 1989–96, as are indicators of the size
of the working class and the middle class.
Please note that these findings speak to the emergence of democracy,
not to its maintenance. We accept the argument of Przeworski and his
colleagues (Przeworski et al. 1996, 2000; Przeworski and Limongi 1997)
that these are separate processes. In other work, we explore the question
of whether intellectual-led democratization is less durable than other
routes to democracy. Further, we accept the possibility that there are
multiple routes to democracy (Tilly 1997, 2000). Intellectuals are not the
only social basis of democratization. A related caveat: we do not suggest
that intellectuals are always vanguards of democracy. Rather, we argue
that, in different ways, intellectuals in particular periods may lead de-
mocratization movements and that two such periods occurred during the
20th century. Our approach is analogous to those of scholars who have
argued that other social classes—the bourgeoisie, the middle class, or the
working class—form the social basis of democratization. The argument
is that social groups may have an “elective affinity” for a particular form
of politics, but that this affinity is expressed only in particular historical
conjunctures: according to one influential analysis, the bourgeoisie sup-
ports democracy only when it emerges from the shadow of repressive
landowning elites (Moore 1966); according to another, the middle class
constructs liberal democratic regimes only when it feels immune to chal-
lenges from the left (Luebbert 1991); in yet another, working-class efforts
on behalf of democracy vary according to international context and the
level of capitalist development (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).
CLASS ACTORS AND DEMOCRATIZATION
The three leading candidates proposed for the social basis of democracy,
then, are the bourgeoisie, the working class, and the middle class.
Bourgeoisie.—Modern economic practices, especially long-term invest-
ment and the rational calculation of market conditions, are said to require
the predictable application of law and limits on the arbitrary application
of state power. For such reasons, the bourgeoisie is said to prefer de-
mocracy to autocracy. Indeed, the bourgeoisie has long been identified as
“the protagonist of democracy,” as noted critically by Rueschemeyer et al.
(1992, p. 46). In Barrington Moore’s famous phrase: “No bourgeois, no
democracy” (Moore 1966, p. 418). Two theoretical traditions have staked
out this position: Marxism, emphasizing the role of capitalist self-interest
in the making of “bourgeois democracy” ever since the Communist man-
ifesto (Marx and Engels [1848] 1978, p. 475; Lenin [1905] 1975b, pp. 123,
139); and liberal pluralism, emphasizing the congruity of economic and
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political “freedoms” (Hayek 1944; Goodell 1985). Recent case studies dem-
onstrating the role of the bourgeoisie in democratization include Cardoso
(1986) and Seidman (1994, pp. 91–142) on Brazil and South Africa; Payne
(1994) on Brazil; Conaghan and Malloy (1994, pp. 86–97) on Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru; Nam (1995) and Bellin (2000) on South Korea; Parsa
(1995) on Iran and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines; and Yılmaz (1999)
on Turkey.
Working class.—Critics of the bourgeoisie’s role in democratization ar-
gue that elites support only limited political openings that they are able
to control, and that full democratization is the work of the working class.
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) present the most extended case material for
this position. They argue that the rise of the bourgeoisie may appear to
be associated with the rise of democracy, but that this correlation is spu-
rious and generated only by an underlying cause: the same capitalist
development that generates a strong bourgeoisie also generates a strong
working class and “it is especially the working class that has often played
a decisively pro-democratic role. . . . Capitalist development enlarges the
urban working class at the expense of agricultural laborers and small
farmers; it thus shifts members of the subordinate classes from an envi-
ronment extremely unfavorable for collective action to one much more
favorable” (pp. 58–59). Other recent case studies emphasizing the role of
the working class in democratization include Adler and Webster (1995)
on South Africa; Collier and Mahoney (1997) and Collier (1999) on several
countries in southern Europe and South America; Fishman (1990) on
Spain; Keck (1992) on Brazil; Osa (1998) on Poland; Seidman (1994) on
Brazil and South Africa; Wood (2000) on El Salvador and South Africa;
and Yashar (1997) on Costa Rica and Guatemala.
Middle class.—Another contemporary social-class argument focuses on
the middle class (Luebbert 1991; Glassman 1995, 1997), following Aris-
totle’s dictum that “democracies are safer and more permanent than ol-
igarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and
has a greater share in government” (Lipset 1981, p. vii), and similar com-
ments by James Mill (Sundhaussen 1991, p. 100). Defining this class is
difficult. Its boundaries appear to combine economic, educational, cul-
tural, and other characteristics, as in this recent description: “People with
more income, in complex and widely interdependent work situations, with
more education, and more access to health and other services are more
likely to ask for increased political freedom” (Lipset, Seong, and Torres
1993, p. 166). Recent case studies of middle-class support for democra-
tization include Girling (1996) on Thailand; Hsiao and Koo (1997) and
Koo (1991) on South Korea and Taiwan; and So and Kwitko (1990) on
Hong Kong. To these three candidates we wish to add a fourth:
Intellectuals.—The prominence of students and graduates in democracy
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movements of the early 20th century, as discussed in this article, leads us
to identify the intellectual “class” as the social basis of democratization.
Similar theories date back to Edmund Burke’s disparaging reference to
the prominent role of “men of letters” in the French Revolution (Charle
1996, p. 74); the self-proclaimed “aristocracy of intelligence” in the Aus-
trian revolution of 1848 (Namier 1946, p. 22); Oxford dons’ search for an
alliance of “brains and numbers” in 1860s Britain (Kent 1978); the Dreyfus
Affair intellectuals’ evolution into a prodemocracy movement in France
in the early 20th century (Blum 1935, p. 103); and the global student
movements of the 1960s (Brochier 1968; Gouldner 1979). This theory
matches the findings of Benavot (1996, pp. 398, 400), who finds a positive
effect of higher-education enrollment rates in 1980 on democratization
during the period 1980–88. Recent case studies of intellectuals’ prode-
mocracy mobilization include Bailly (1995, pp. 109–20) on Côte d’Ivoire;
Calhoun (1994) and Cherrington (1991) on China; Garcelon (1997) and
Greenfeld (1996) on the Soviet Union; Puryear (1994) on Chile; Torpey
(1995) on East Germany; and Williams (1998) on Nigeria.
It may seem anomalous today to speak of intellectuals as a “class,” even
with the quotation marks, but this was not always so. In the early 20th
century, it was not uncommon for intellectuals to refer to themselves as
a class (e.g., James 1912, p. 319; Lévy 1931, p. 6, both quoted below).
This definition involved a certain amount of self-congratulation: other
classes are beholden to narrow economic interests as a result of their
participation in production, in this view, while intellectuals’ interests are
congruent with those of society as a whole as a result of intellectuals’
nonparticipation in production. Hostile observers also used class termi-
nology, while suggesting that intellectuals’ interests were just as narrow
as those of other classes, if not more so (Berth 1914). This terminology
was reintroduced to the study of intellectuals in the late 20th century by
Pierre Bourdieu (1989a, 1989b, 1990). We do not insist on the term “class”
but adopt it in this article to be consistent with previous theories on
democratization that use the concept. We note that our findings may be
interpreted through a nonclass perspective as well, which would empha-
size a more diffuse impact of higher education on democratization in the
late 20th century.
Quantitative studies of democratization frequently theorize the impor-
tance of one or more classes but have not used direct measures to test
their theories. Bollen and Jackman (1995, pp. 983–84) criticize Muller
(1995) on this very point. Muller argues that “increase in size of [the]
urban middle and/or working class” (p. 969) is one of the key factors in
democratization, but he takes no direct measure of the size of these classes,
using national wealth and income inequality instead. Lipset et al. (1993,
p. 166), too, argue explicitly that democracy is the work of the middle
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class; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994, p. 903) suggest that “increasing
economic benefits for the masses intensify demands for the political ben-
efits of democracy”; Crenshaw (1995, p. 703) wishes to test the “class-
analytic approach” focusing alternatively on the role of the bourgeoisie
or the working class; and Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p. 157) seek to
test the hypothesis that “various groups, whether the bourgeoisie, workers,
or just the amorphous ‘civil society,’ rise against the dictatorial regime,
and it falls.” Yet none of these studies measures the size, much less the
strength or political attitudes or activism, of the social groups in question.
Instead, these studies use national-level variables—primarily national
wealth—as proxies for social classes. In the latter part of this article, we
try to improve on this record with a first stab at direct measures of the
size of these various classes.
How to conceptualize classes? The wide-ranging debates on this subject
offer little closure, and there are some who consider the concept of class
to be hopelessly flawed (Pakulski and Waters 1996). We are not going to
resolve the controversy over its meaning and value. Indeed, methodolog-
ical constraints have driven us to adopt quite separate approaches for
our two tests of the hypothesis that classes, in particular the intellectuals,
matter for democratization. These approaches lie on opposite sides of the
great divide in the study of class: a focus on classes-in-themselves and a
focus on classes-for-themselves. The latter approach, exemplified by the
work of E. P. Thompson (1963), treats classes as existing when people
believe in them and act accordingly. The former approach, which appears
to be dominant in contemporary social science (see reviews of the field
in Saunders [2001]; Sørenson [2001]; Wright [2001]), treats classes as ob-
jective social categories whose existence may or may not be recognized
or championed by their members.2 Our study of the 1905–12 wave of
democratizations adopts the class-for-itself approach (with the exception
of a preliminary glance at higher-education statistics), focusing on the
collective mobilization of people who called themselves intellectuals. Our
study of the 1989–96 wave of democratizations adopts the class-in-itself
approach (with the exception of the measure of the bourgeoisie), focusing
on the size of objective social categories.
INTELLECTUALS AND DEMOCRATIZATION, 1905–12
The term “intellectuals,” as a collective self-identification, gained global
popularity through the Dreyfus Affair in France in 1898, in which a
2 Bourdieu’s (1987) approach may be characterized as an intermediate position: classes
may act for themselves without recognizing that they are doing so.
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movement of French writers and academics contested and eventually
overturned the conviction of a Jewish military officer imprisoned for trea-
son (Charle 1990; Gervereau and Prochasson 1994; Ory and Sirinelli 1986).
Intellectuals around the world followed news of the Dreyfus Affair in-
tently, and many intellectuals appear to have drawn inspiration from the
mobilization of their French comrades (Leroy 1983; Veillard 1994). In
addition, they drew on the term “intellectuals” itself. In Spain, where
virtually “all the literate men” of Barcelona signed a manifesto in support
of the Dreyfusards (Jareño López 1981, p. 154), the term intelectuales
gained currency almost immediately (Marichal 1990, p. 18). In Iran, the
terms daneshmandan (knowledgable ones) and, later, monavvaran ol-fekr
(people of enlightened thought) became popular terms of self-identification
among those with modern education, as did the terms münevveran (en-
lightened ones) in Turkey and ziyalilar (enlightened ones) in Central Asia.
In Russia, the older term intelligentsia, previously used to refer to
alienated, radical youths, changed in meaning to encompass the broader
identity of the French term intellectuels (Confino 1972, p. 138; Fischer
1958, pp. 51–52). In the United States, the term “intellectuals” was adopted
by progressive academics and political reformers such as the philosopher
William James, who told the Association of American Alumni in 1907:
We alumni and alumnae of the colleges are the only permanent presence
that corresponds to the aristocracy in older countries. We have continuous
traditions, as they have; our motto, too, is noblesse oblige; and unlike them,
we stand for ideal interests solely, for we have no corporate selfishness and
wield no power of corruption. We sought to have our own class conscious-
ness. “Les intellectuels!” What prouder clubname could there be than this
one. (James 1912, p. 319)
Who were the intellectuals? In objective terms, they were the holders
of advanced degrees, this being the equivalent of a high school degree in
some countries in this period. In subjective terms, intellectuals consisted
of people who called themselves intellectuals. In other words, the category
was a contested badge of honor or an insult. On one hand, intellectuals
were constantly inventing and defending definitions of their group that
would include themselves and exclude others (Bauman 1987, p. 8). On
the other hand, anti-intellectuals—including writers and other educated
individuals who “objectively” belonged among the intellectuals—derided
the group as effete (as opposed to men of action), deracinated (as opposed
to good nationalists), and freethinking (as opposed to those who respected
authority) (Honoré 1983). Clearly, not all intellectuals supported democ-
ratization, and we have no cross-national estimates of the relative size of
these groups: people who claimed intellectual identity versus people who
rejected it despite being well-educated. Classes-in-themselves, however
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defined, almost always include putative members who do not consider
themselves to be members of the class.
In the early 20th century, though, people who identified themselves as
intellectuals, who sought to build solidarity among intellectuals, and who
saw this social group as having an important role to play in social and
political life—these intellectuals supported democratization. When the
intellectuals’ collective identity and organization were on the increase,
democratization movements were more likely; when intellectuals were
dispirited and disorganized, as in the interwar period described by Michels
(1932), they turned more to antidemocracy movements.
Descriptive Statistics
Six countries underwent prodemocracy revolutions in the years before
World War I: Russia in 1905, Iran in 1906, the Ottoman Empire in 1908,
Portugal in 1910, Mexico in 1911, and China in 1912 (see the schematic
chronology in table 1). All of these countries ousted dictators or forced
them to accept significant limits on their power. All of them promulgated
or reinstituted constitutions. All of them held elections and convened
parliaments in an atmosphere of relative freedom. All of them witnessed
the almost overnight emergence of a boisterous press.
We wish to compare these six with nondemocracies of the period that
did not undergo democratization. By late 20th-century standards, almost
all independent countries at that time were nondemocracies. Only four
countries enfranchised more than half of the adult population (Flora 1983;
Boli 1987, p. 139; Mackie and Rose 1991). Only eight or 13 countries
could be called democracies in 1904—the year prior to the wave of de-
mocratizations—according to the definitions suggested in two recent lon-
gitudinal democracy scales, Polyarchy (Vanhanen 1984; 2000a, p. 257;
2000b) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2003; Jaggers and Gurr 1995,
pp. 473–74). Polity IV is a 21-point integer scale constructed from two
subscales: DEMOC and AUTOC. DEMOC is an 11-point scale (0–10)
that awards points for various levels of competitiveness of political par-
ticipation (up to 3 points), competitiveness of executive recruitment (up
to 2 points), openness of executive recruitment (up to 1 point), and con-
straint on chief executive (up to 4 points). AUTOC is an 11-point scale
(0–10) that awards points for high levels of regulation of political partic-
ipation (up to 2 points) and low levels of competitiveness of political
participation (up to 2 points), competitiveness of executive recruitment
(up to 2 points), openness of executive recruitment (up to 1 point), and
constraint on chief executive (up to 3 points). Subtracting AUTOC from
DEMOC generates a summary measure, POLITY, with a range from
10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). The second scale, the
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Index of Democracy (ID) in Vanhanen’s Polyarchy data set, is constructed
from electoral data. It consists of the product of two indicators: the per-
centage of the popular votes received by political parties other than the
leading party, and the percentage of the country’s population that votes,
converted into a 100-point scale (Vanhanen 1997, 2000b). The authors of
both scales have proposed cutoffs for minimum levels that can be called
democracy: 6 for POLITY (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, p. 474) and 5 for ID
(Vanhanen 1990, p. 33; Vanhanen 1997, pp. 63, 80; Vanhanen 2000a, p.
257).
The democratic standards of the early 20th century, however, were
somewhat less restrictive: Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands, for
example, were considered democracies at the time (Bryce 1922), but they
fail to meet one or both of the Polyarchy or Polity IV thresholds. To create
a time-specific comparison set of nondemocracies, we take the range of
democracy scores for 1904 of the six countries that were about to undergo
prodemocracy revolutions. These countries occupy Polity IV (Marshall
and Jaggers 2003) scores less than or equal to -3, and Polyarchy (Vanhanen
2000b) scores less than or equal to 0.5.
These criteria generate categories of 22 democracies and 31 non-
democracies in 1904. The nondemocracies were considerably lower in
socioeconomic development than the democracies of the time, as gauged
by Arthur Banks’s (1981) composite index (see table 2).3 The nondemo-
cracies were also less literate (Flora 1973), less highly educated (Banks
1971), less urbanized (Banks 1971), and less Protestant (Barrett 1982).4
Their states were less democratic historically (Marshall and Jaggers 2003;
Vanhanen 2000b) and raised less revenue per capita (Banks 1971).
These comparisons confirm one of the most consistent statistical find-
ings in social science: the correlation between economic development and
levels of democracy (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1993; Londregan and Poole
1996). Economic development also underlies all of the main class-based
theories of democratization: it is associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie
(Marx and Engels 1978; Lenin 1975b; Moore 1966), the expansion of the
working class (Therborn 1977; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), and the emer-
gence of a middle class (Lipset 1959, 1993).
We therefore expect that the most economically developed of the non-
3 The Banks (1981) scale of socioeconomic development is composed of urbanization,
government revenue and expenditure, imports and exports per capita, rail mileage per
square mile, mail per capita, telephones per capita, percent work force in agriculture,
steel production per capita, cement production per capita, and gross national product
per capita. This scale is available for a large portion of countries in 1904, while single
indicators of socioeconomic development are not.
4 Barrett (1982) reports the percentage of professing Protestants and Anglicans sepa-
rately; these categories are summed in this article.
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Correlates of Democratization, 1904–12
Independent Variable










Banks socioeconomic index (1901–5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86 .40* .84 .94
Banks index#population (1901–5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28,256 54,372* 13,942 87,903*
Banks index growth (1881–84 to 1901–5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 .32 .40 .46
Urbanization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 16.3* 3.4 6.8
Social:
Population (in thousands) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,010 18,420 6,758 98,765*
Literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.1 72.4* 43.4 22.6*
Protestantism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 42.2* 4.8 .5
Political:
British heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 44.5* 0 0
Government revenue per capita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478.3 1,357.9* 473.0 499.5
Democratic heritage (Polity IV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.4 72.1* 39.7 20.8*
Democratic heritage (Polyarchy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 4.5* .3 .1
Intellectual class:
Mean secondary enrollment per capita (1865–1904) . . . . . . . . . .001 .006* .001 .001
Mean university enrollment per capita (1865–1904) . . . . . . . . . .0001 .0008* .001 .002
Sum secondary enrollment, in thousands (1865–1904) . . . . . . . 546.2 2,531.2* 327.3 1,494.5
Sum university enrollment, in thousands (1865–1904) . . . . . . . 70.5 587.9* 54.2 141.2
N countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 22 25 6
Note.— “Democracies” are defined by either POLITY 1 3 or Polyarchy ID 1 0.5 in 1904; “democratizers” are defined by the coming to power of a constitutional
revolution in the years 1905–12 (Russia, Iran, Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Mexico, China). Independent variables use 1904 values. Significance levels refer to one-
tailed t-test for comparison of means.
 .P ! .10
* .P ! .05
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democracies would be most likely to undergo democratization soon there-
after. Only Russia fits these theoretical expectations. Of the nondemocra-
cies in 1904, it was among the most economically developed (Banks 1981).
It had more miles of railroad track than any other country in the world,
except for the United States (Banks 1971). Its exports ranked sixth in the
world, and its steel production fourth (Banks 1971). The Russian revo-
lution of 1905, leading to the proclamation of a sort of constitution late
in the year and the election of a parliament the following spring, is con-
sistent with the correlation between economic development and democ-
ratization so frequently demonstrated in the second half of the 20th
century.
But the expected pattern is broken in some of the democratizations
that followed Russia’s. These democratizers were not necessarily the most
economically developed countries in 1904, according to Arthur Banks’s
(1981) scale. China and Iran, for example, were among the four least-
developed countries in the world, and the Ottoman Empire ranked in the
middle of Banks’s list. On average, the six democratizers were slightly
less developed than the countries that remained nondemocracies during
this period, though the difference is not statistically significant (see table
2). Similarly, various databases show that democratizers had lower literacy
rates than nondemocratizers (Flora 1973), slightly lower primary school
enrollment rates (Banks 1971; Benavot and Riddle 1988, pp. 205–7), and
somewhat less democratic heritage (measured by the country’s average
Polity IV and Polyarchy ratings prior to 1904 as a percentage of the
maximum ratings).5 Their populations were slightly less Protestant, ac-
cording to Barrett’s (1982) estimates of professed faiths in 1900.
Although per capita terms are the natural lens for late 20th-century
development, they may be anachronistic for the early 20th century. In
that period, observers more frequently used absolute figures to measure
development (Keltie 1904; Great Britain 1914). It was common at the
time to view history as the product of vanguard visionaries, whose im-
portance in shaping a nation’s destiny far outstripped their small numbers.
The democratizers were considerably more populous than nondemocra-
tizers, on average (from Banks 1971), and when we multiply the Banks’s
development scale (first adding 2.5 to bring the lowest cases above zero)
by population, we find that the democratizers begin to cluster near the
top of the list: six of the 10 most developed nondemocratic countries in
1904, in these absolute terms, underwent democratization in the wave of
1905–12. The means of democratizers and nondemocratizers are signifi-
cantly different. This combination of high absolute levels of development
5 To calculate democratic heritage, we added 10 to all Polity ratings, bringing negative
values to 0 or above.
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and low per capita levels suggests that democratization was associated
with an enclave of modernity surrounded by a sea of premodernity. This
enclave image is confirmed by the marginally significant difference in
means for urbanization (percentage of population living in cities of 100,000
or more, from Banks 1971).
Such an enclave is consistent with all of the class-based explanations
of democratization: the bourgeoisie, the middle class, the working class,
and the intellectuals, all of whom were associated with modern institutions
and urban settings. However, we do not have direct measures of any class
but the intellectuals, and that one is not ideal (for a discussion of oper-
ationalizations of class, see the first part of the analysis of the 1989–96
democratizations). Banks (1971) gives the number and rate of secondary
and university students in each country—we sum the absolute number
and average the rate for the years 1865–1904, in an attempt to proxy the
size of the secondary- and university-educated population in each country.
This count does not include people who studied abroad and returned,
and it does not indicate how many intellectuals emigrated after studying
in their country of origin—both of which groups played significant roles
in some of the democratization movements of the period. It does not
measure the level of self-organization of the intellectuals. And it does not
distinguish between educated people who self-identified as intellectuals
and those who did not. Nonetheless, using this best-available data, we
find that existing democracies in 1904 had produced far more university-
educated people than had nondemocracies. Among the nondemocracies,
there are no significant differences in the per capita figures between coun-
tries that democratized in the following decade and those that did not.
The absolute numbers of secondary and university students, however, are
more than twice as high in the democratizers, with the difference reaching
a marginal level of significance for secondary students.
The implication is that democratization is associated with the building
of a cadre of university students and graduates. For example, Afghanistan
had only perhaps 100 high school students and a handful of graduates
in 1904, most of them associated with the newly founded Habibiyya
School, the first modern-style high school in the country (Gregorian 1969,
p. 184). Like their colleagues in neighboring Iran, whose multiplying
modern-style schools were a model for the Habibiyya School, intellectuals
in Kabul organized themselves into a prodemocracy movement, the Na-
tional Secret Party, and began in 1906 to publish a newspaper, Lamp of
the News of Afghanistan (Ahang 1970, p. 31; Nawid 1997, p. 598). A poem
in the first issue linked intellectuals and the demand for liberty, suggesting
that education “wiped oppression off the mirror of time” (Habibi 1993,
p. 42). But unlike the prodemocracy movement in Iran, the movement in
Afghanistan was too small to effect serious change, failed to garner the
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support of other social groups, and could not protect itself when royalists
denounced the party to King Habibullah. The monarch, a self-described
“advocate of Western learning”—he had founded the Habibiyya School
and named it after himself—considered democratic demands to be a threat
to his prerogatives and, in any case, premature, as Afghans “needed thirty
years of education to be fitted for the post” of democratic citizenship
(Gregorian 1969, pp. 187, 212). In 1909, many of the prodemocracy in-
tellectuals were arrested, including officials of the Habibiyya School, and
some were executed (Ghani [1921] 1980, p. 65; Ghobar 1983, pp. 716–20;
Nawid 1997, p. 598). Thereafter, Afghan intellectuals downplayed de-
mocracy and addressed reform projects to royal patronage (Gregorian
1969, p. 213; Tarzi 1912).
Institutional Linkages of Intellectuals and Democratization Movements
Turning from quantitative to qualitative analysis, we find that the infra-
structure of the democracy movements is closely linked with the self-
conscious collective organization of intellectuals in all six countries that
underwent prodemocracy revolutions. In Russia, the central prodemoc-
racy organization, the Union of Liberation, emerged in 1901–3 from stu-
dent groups, professional associations, and gentry-intellectuals. All of its
members had secondary degrees (in a country more than half illiterate);
82% had a higher education; 21% worked in journalism, 20% in science
and academia, and 16% in law (Galai 1973, pp. 113–19; Fröhlich 1981,
pp. 238–39). The prodemocracy movement’s “banquet campaign” in 1904
brought together educated people from various professions in an attempt
to unite “the bulk of the country’s intelligentsia around the constitutional
banner,” in the words of one of the organizers (Ascher 1988, p. 66). The
Union of Unions, which organized the strikes in 1905 that forced the tsar
to grant democratic rights (the October Manifesto), also viewed itself as
the representative of the intellectuals: “Under the present conditions we
members of the intelligentsia have for too long protested merely by word”
(Sanders 1985, p. 845).
Similarly, other prodemocracy movements of the era also involved self-
conscious collective action on the part of intellectuals. In Iran, the first
explicitly prodemocracy organization, the Revolutionary Committee, was
founded in May 1904 by 57 men, almost all of whom had a modern
education in one form or another, either at European-style schools in Iran
or through informal study of European languages or ideas (Abrahamian
1982, pp. 78–79; Malekzadeh 1950, vol. 2, pp. 9–10). A leader of the
organization announced the social basis of the movement at the first
meeting: “However benevolent a force of intellect and faith intellectual
[the anachronistic term rowshanfekr is used in this report] men may mo-
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bilize, they will not succeed in anything without gaining power and
strength” (Malekzadeh 1950, vol. 2, p. 13). A second prodemocracy or-
ganization, the Secret Society, was founded in early 1905 with a similar
self-understanding. One of the founders opened the first meeting with
these words: “Oh gentlemen, oh intellectuals [daneshmandan], oh patriots,
oh supporters and reformers of Islam” (Nazem al-Eslam Kermani 1968,
p. 6). The triumph of the prodemocracy movement in the summer of 1906,
during a monthlong sit-in held on the British legation grounds in Tehran,
acquired its prodemocracy character only when a delegation of teachers,
graduates, and students from modern schools joined the sit-in and com-
mandeered it. Setting up their own tent alongside those of the various
guilds of the city (Tafreshi-Hosseini 1973, p. 41), these modern intellectuals
lectured on democracy, teaching that “when the nation no longer wants
a shah [king] he is not recognized” (Martin 1989, p. 93) and turning the
sit-in into “one vast open-air school of political science” (Abrahamian 1982,
p. 84). “Since those who took refuge in the Embassy had absolutely no
concept as to what a constitution was or what it required, a special group
kept them informed and instilled in them its own ideas,” according to a
socialist prodemocracy activist (Sheikholeslami and Wilson 1973, p. 37).
Intellectuals dominated the sit-in’s negotiating committee and inserted a
constitution and a parliament among the protest’s demands; they kept
various groups from leaving the sit-in as negotiations continued over these
demands (Abrahamian 1969, p. 134; 1982, p. 85; Bayat 1991, p. 135;
Browne (1910) 1995, p. 122; Hakim (1911) 1999, p. 311; Martin 1989, pp.
94–96; Nazem al-Eslam Kermani 1968, pp. 118–19, 272–74; Tafreshi-
Hosseini 1973, pp. 41–42).
In Mexico, the leader of the prodemocracy movement, Francisco Ma-
dero, identified as the leading supporters of democratization “the poor
intellectuals who have not suffered the corrupting influence of wealth.
Among those one finds the thinkers, the philosophers, the writers, the
lovers of the Fatherland and of Freedom” (Madero [1908] 1990 , p. 170).
In China, “It is estimated that at least ninety-five percent of those who
received part of their education in other lands became, on their return,
leaders of revolutionary thought” (Brown 1912, p. 81); modern intellec-
tuals were so closely identified with the democracy movement that in late
1911, when the prodemocracy revolution had broken out, antidemocratic
imperial forces executed young men in at least one city for wearing modern
school uniforms (Liew 1971, p. 123). In Portugal, intellectuals saw them-
selves as the “vanguard” of society (Ramos 1992), endowed with “the
sacred mission” of transforming the nation (Valente 1976, p. 145), and the
democracy movement’s self-conception appears to have centered on the
“enlightened” elements that compose “the great base of the Republican
Party” (Vilela 1977, p. 112). The Ottoman prodemocracy activists “re-
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cruit[ed] their ranks, for the most part, among the intellectual youth,”
according to a participant (Keramett Bey 1924, p. 477; also Hanioǧlu
1995, p. 207), and an opponent derided prodemocracy leaders as “Turkish
Dreyfuses” (Kara 1994, p. 75). The leading prodemocracy Ottoman news-
paper, published in Paris, editorialized:
Thus whether the people get upset about something—for example, whether
or not they will oppose despotism—depends on the intellectuals of the
nation. . . . In sum, it may be said that if a small rudder can by itself steer
a ship ten or twenty thousand times its size, the intellectual notables can
similarly manage the ordinary masses, steering them forward or backward.
(Şûra-yı Ümmet, May 20, 1905, p. 1)6
This correspondence of democracy movements with intellectual self-
organization is worth exploring through a “deviant” case. Colombia had
as many intellectuals in 1905 as Portugal, which experienced democra-
tization soon thereafter. If intellectuals mattered for democratization, why
didn’t Colombia undergo democratization? One answer involves the prob-
lematic self-organization of the Colombian intellectuals. Although Colom-
bia had quite a few intellectuals, they were deeply divided amongst them-
selves and had in fact fought a civil war several years earlier (1898–1902).
The liberals were led by Rafael Uribe Uribe, who championed the “in-
tellectual proletariat” (Santa 1980, p. 56) and argued that “dictatorship is
a vulgarity; to disdain it, one need only be somewhat learned, somewhat
intelligent, and have a somewhat good education” (Uribe Uribe 1979, p.
247). Opposed to these self-identifying intellectuals were conservatives
who criticized higher education in Colombia, emphasized Catholic faith
rather than rational free-thinking, and pressured liberal intellectuals to
sign oaths written by Catholic bishops (Farrell 1974, pp. 307–9). Civil
war erupted between these two strands of intellectuals and damaged the
prospects for collective democratic action (Bergquist 1978; Delpar 1981).
The Colombian case underscores the importance of intellectual organi-
zation, and not merely numbers, in fostering democratization during this
period.
Hegemony of Intellectuals in the Democratization Movements
A further confirmation of the role of intellectuals in democratization before
World War I is the leadership accorded to them by other social groups
participating in prodemocracy movements. The intellectuals were hege-
monic, in that their interests and goals were equated with the interests
6 We thank M. Şükrü Hanioǧlu for providing this source, and Yektan Türkyılmaz for
translation assistance.
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and goals of society as a whole. The classes commonly identified in the
social scientific literature as the protagonists of democratization viewed
themselves not as leaders but as followers of the intellectuals. This is not
to say that the bourgeoisie, the workers, and the middle class were whole-
heartedly in favor of democratization. Rather, we argue that the portions
of these classes that favored democratization did so under the banner of
the intellectuals’ movement. We present as evidence the political activities
of the organizations claiming to represent these classes; for this reason,
we omit discussion of the middle class, which was not represented in its
own name in the early 20th century in these countries.
The emerging bourgeoisie.—Lenin called the pre–World War I wave of
democratizations “a whole series of bourgeois-democratic national move-
ments” (Lenin [1914] 1975a, p. 162), but, even if we accept this charac-
terization, it is striking that the bourgeoisie was a latecomer to these
movements. Most capitalists in these countries were closely linked to the
autocratic state and were unwilling to risk their economic position by
associating with political reformers.
When capitalists became partially involved in the prodemocracy move-
ment, they did so with deference to the hegemony of the intellectuals. In
Russia, industrialists who supported democratization even adopted the
identity of “intellectual.” V. Belov, for example, wrote that “all of us in-
telligentsia, industrialists and non-industrialists, feel every minute that
we are under surveillance” (McDaniel 1988, pp. 128–29). In early 1905,
business associations in Russia began to adopt a prodemocracy line in
response to workers’ strikes. The government proposed to end the strikes
by forcing business owners to make economic concessions; the business
owners balked and proposed instead that the government end the strikes
by making political concessions. This conflict drove a wedge between the
autocracy and its erstwhile supporters in the bourgeoisie (Menashe 1968,
p. 355; Owen 1981, pp. 175–78; Rieber 1982, p. 345; Roosa 1975, pp. 130–
31; Ruckman 1984, pp. 195–201). The capitalists trying to forge a na-
tionwide bourgeois organization sought to gain admission to the intellec-
tuals’ prodemocracy organization in mid-1905. The intellectuals—
apparently unwilling to risk sacrificing workers’ support—turned the
capitalists’ delegation away at the door. The capitalists, furious and em-
barrassed, asked the intellectuals to consider that “this visit had not taken
place” (Owen 1981, pp. 186–87; Rieber 1982, p. 312).
The intellectuals’ democracy movements were more open to bourgeois
support in the other cases under study. In Portugal, for example, an in-
tellectual worried in the months after democratization that “we are turning
against us the same bourgeoisie that allowed us to make the republic.
. . . Do you not recall that the ox that feeds can change into the ox that
gores” (Brandão 1933, pp. 35–36). In China, portions of the bourgeoisie
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in Tientsin (Sheridan 1975, p. 45), Guangdong (Friedman 1968, p. 32),
Shanghai (Bergère 1989, p. 198), and the southeast Asian diaspora (Yen
1976, pp. 264–77) helped to fund the intellectuals’ prodemocracy move-
ment. In Mexico, several important prodemocracy figures were themselves
capitalists, including the movement’s leader, Francisco I. Madero—
though Madero preferred to identify himself as a representative of the
“intellectual element” in Mexican society (Madero 1990, p. 210). Yet bour-
geois organizations in Mexico failed almost entirely to support Madero
and his prodemocracy movement, which they attributed to “laggards”
who have made a “deep and disagreeable impression . . . among the
sensible part of society” (El Economista Mexicano, November 26, 1910,
p. 177). In the Ottoman Empire, chambers of commerce and industry
appear to have played no role in the prodemocracy movement, though
several individual businessmen were active (Kansu 1997, chap. 2) and
business associations expressed satisfaction upon its coming to power (To-
prak 1995, pp. 84–87).
Oddly, the emerging bourgeoisie played its greatest role in this wave
of democratizations in the country where it was least well developed. In
Iran, there were few industrial enterprises, and chambers of commerce
had been banned two decades earlier (Afary 1996, pp. 30–31; Bayat 1991,
pp. 47–49). Yet leading merchants, organized in traditional guild asso-
ciations, catapulted the democracy movement into power by engaging in
sit-ins against the state’s arbitrary economic policies (Gilbar 1977). The
merchants’ goals were limited, but they called in students and faculty
from Tehran’s new modern schools, who lectured them on the need for
democracy and inserted the call for a constitution and a parliament into
the strikers’ list of demands (see previous subsection). In Iran, as else-
where, the emerging bourgeoisie took a back seat to the intellectuals in
the democracy movement.
The working class.—The emerging working class, too, where it existed,
identified the democracy movement with the intellectuals. In Russia, Fa-
ther Georgii A. Gapon, the leader of the largest union in St. Petersburg,
established contacts with “several intellectual Liberals” and “invited stu-
dents and other educated people to deliver lectures at all our branches
on political questions.” Gapon then endorsed the intellectuals’ prode-
mocracy platform and had its demands read at union meetings, where
workers indicated enthusiastic, almost millenarian, approval (Gapon 1905,
pp. 133–40; Surh 1989, pp. 140–67). The reading of the demands for
democracy “brought the listeners to a frenzy” at one meeting, according
to one eyewitness (McDaniel 1988, p. 268). On January 9, 1905, Gapon
and thousands of his followers carried these demands to the tsar’s palace
in a massive demonstration that the military fired upon, killing hundreds.
This event, known as Bloody Sunday, ignited the democracy movement.
American Journal of Sociology
956
Even Lenin dropped his hostility toward “bourgeois democracy” for a
moment and urged “the proletarian not to keep aloof from the bourgeois
revolution,” but rather “to take a most energetic part in it” (Lenin 1975b,
p. 126).
In Mexico and Portugal, workers agitated for intellectual prodemocracy
leaders, even intellectuals who disparaged workers’ material demands.
“Surge et ambula,” one prodemocracy intellectual told workers in Por-
tugal—a Latin phrase that might be translated uncharitably as “get up
and walk” (Valente 1976, p. 173). Yet workers participated actively in the
Portuguese democracy movement, suffered the bulk of casualties during
the prodemocracy revolution (Valente 1976, pp. 88–89, 138–39), and even
stood guard during the brief interregnum “defending the banks and the
money of the rich, with the police and the Guard completely disarmed,”
as a prodemocracy intellectual recalled in amazement (Brandão 1919, p.
87). Similarly in Mexico, workers supported the democracy movement
despite its ambiguous stance toward working-class economic demands
(Anderson 1976, pp. 254–97).
In China, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire, democracy movements came
to power in spite of the almost complete lack of modern working classes.
The first industrial union in the Ottoman Empire contacted the exiled
prodemocracy movement in the 1890s, but this union was soon suppressed
(Dumont 1977, pp. 244–45). Various popular associations signed on to the
intellectuals’ prodemocracy programs in Iran (Foran 1991, p. 805), certain
regions of China (Chesneaux 1971, pp. 135–59; Esherick 1976; Shimizu
1984), and the westernmost parts of the Ottoman Empire (Hanioǧlu 2001,
pp. 242–61), but these were traditional or neotraditional groups, not pro-
letarians. A modern working class—like a developed bourgeoisie—did not
appear to have been necessary for democratization; and where this class
existed, it supported the intellectuals’ prodemocracy platform.
Intellectuals’ Role in the Newly Democratized State
After democratization, when elections were permitted and parliaments
met, intellectuals were the prime beneficiaries of the transition, and they
acted in their own self-interest. In theory, one group might undermine the
old regime and another might construct the new regime that follows. That
the same group did both in the cases under study is our final set of evidence
for the crucial role of intellectuals in the democratizations of 1905–12.
In Russia, the leading party elected to parliament was the Constitutional
Democratic (Kadet) Party. This was a “professors’ party,” according to its
leader, Pavel N. Miliukov; another party activist called it a “faculty of
politicians” (McClelland 1979, p. 67); professionals comprised 60% of the
party’s candidates for office in early 1906, and another 25% were educated
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salaried employees (Emmons 1983, pp. 160–79). Parliament, dominated
by the Kadet plurality, was “the dregs of the Russian ‘intelligentsia,’” a
hostile observer commented (Ascher 1992, p. 178).
The Kadet Party’s platform placed great emphasis on the interests of
the intellectuals. These interests aspired to be hegemonic—that is, intel-
lectuals wanted other groups to believe that what was good for the in-
tellectuals was good for society as a whole. Freedom of expression, for
example—listed third in the Kadet program—may be good for society as
a whole, but it is particularly beneficial for writers. Judicial autonomy
(listed fourth) serves the interests of legal experts. Education (listed eighth)
is a priority for teachers, for whom the Kadets envisioned a massive jobs
program that would allow the intellectuals to reproduce themselves at a
greater rate than previously possible: “complete autonomy and freedom
of instruction in universities and other higher schools. Increase in their
number. Decrease in tuition. Organization, by the higher schools, of ed-
ucational work for the entire populace. Freedom of student organization.
. . . Establishment of universal, free, and compulsory primary education.”
These expressions of intellectuals’ self-interest did not prevent the Kadets
from espousing the interests of other classes as well: appealing to peasants
and workers, the party included sections on land reform (sixth) and labor
legislation (seventh) (Harcave 1964, pp. 292–300). This sensitivity to pop-
ular, nonintellectual issues set the Russian prodemocracy party apart from
the other cases in this study, though it was not enough to maintain popular
support for democracy.
The Kadets were able to accomplish little of this agenda during their
brief period in parliament. Similarly in the Ottoman Empire, intellectuals
were ousted from power within a year, too soon to have generated much
of a track record, despite their intentions. During the months before the
military stepped in, intellectuals proposed educational reform, labor ar-
bitration, tax reform, and agrarian modernization (Kansu 1997, pp. 149–
50, 162–63).
In other new democracies, however, intellectuals had a longer run in
power and were able to control parts of the executive branch, not just
the legislative. In these countries, the intellectuals left a greater record of
accomplishments as evidence of their rule.
In Portugal, the new constituent assembly included 52 physicians
among its 229 members, plus 41 lawyers, 9 journalists, and 8 high school
teachers (Valente 1976, p. 223). The editors of the prodemocracy news-
paper the World urged “the heroes of the field of battle”—those who had
participated in the prodemocracy revolt—to give way to “the heroes of
thought,” who would rule the new democracy (Valente 1976, p. 191). This
self-image was matched by outsiders’ testimony as well. Old-style intel-
lectuals complained, “The diploma in this country is everything—wisdom,
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nothing” (D’Almeida 1920, p. 126). Less educated republicans complained
that all the best government jobs were going to youths whose sole qual-
ification was “having spent years of their youth eating liver-steaks and
strumming guitars alongside the learned teat of the University” (Valente
1976, p. 198).
Among the first acts of the provisional cabinet in Portugal, after the
replacement of monarchist governing bodies, were decrees dear to the
interests of the intellectuals: the expulsion of the Jesuits—paragons of
premodern intellectuals—and the replacement of the agency heads for
primary, secondary, and higher education. Then in the second week, pri-
mary school inspectors were replaced; new guidelines for high school
teachers were promulgated, emphasizing modern degrees; and high school
rectors were fired, their administrative tasks to be assumed by councils
of modern-educated scholars. In the third week, Christian teaching in
primary schools was replaced with civic education; tuition was made free
at the University of Coimbra and the Polytechnical School of Lisbon; the
Academy of Sciences was reorganized; and the cabinet took to micro-
management of the University of Coimbra, abolishing caps and gowns,
oaths, and the first-year theology requirement (Morgado 1910, pp. 12–
76). “Of all the works that the Republic has to undertake, national ed-
ucation is the one to which it must dedicate its greatest forces,” the minister
of the interior announced in the fourth week of the new regime (Morgado
1910, p. 134). Enrollment in universities and high schools rose 50% and
300%, respectively, during the democratic era; hundreds of new teachers
were hired, and teachers’ salaries were improved. Government education
budgets rose dramatically, tilted toward secondary and higher education
rather than to primary education (Oliveira 1980, p. 133; 1991, pp. 531–
61).
In Mexico, young intellectuals “picked up the plums of office, while the
real captains of the revolution”—the nonintellectuals who had actually
fought against the dictator’s army—“were fobbed off with, at best, lowly
commissions in the rurales [gendarmes]” (Knight 1986, pp. 166–67). A
disappointed prodemocracy activist recalled that Madero, the new,
university-educated president, “democratic as far as possible for a man
of his class, preferred a priori the lawyer to the carpenter” (Gavira 1933,
p. 57). One of the first policies of the new era was educational reform
(Pani 1918, pp. 11–12). Federal spending on secondary and higher edu-
cation increased by more than 40% between 1910 and 1912, while total
government spending rose 7%; spending on primary education increased
only 3% (Ley de ingresos 1910, pp. 171, 329; 1912, pp. 189, 353).
In China, one of the ruling intellectuals’ first acts was to discount
telegraph rates for news reports as a boon to journalists (Link 1981, pp.
110–11). Other measures increased enrollment in the federal education
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system by 85% over prerevolutionary levels (Huang 1915, vol. 1, pp. 157–
58).7 Guangdong Province, where the democracy movement was most
entrenched and foreign-educated men occupied “practically all the im-
portant government posts for the province,” moved toward universal,
compulsory primary education (Friedman 1968, pp. 162–64, 175, 178, 179).
Similarly, in Iran, more than half the members of the first two parliaments
had a modern education (Shaji‘i 1965, p. 225), in a country with only a
few dozen modern schools (Menashri 1992, p. 60). Parliament granted
modern-educated lawyers a dominant position in the legal system, dis-
placing seminary-trained scholars as judges (Floor 1983). Modern-
educated physicians were protected from traditionally trained competition
(Menashri 1992, pp. 83–85) and granted new powers in the field of public
health, with specific tax revenues dedicated to their efforts (Elgood 1951,
pp. 531–32). Systems of censorship were dismantled and intellectuals dove
into the profession of journalism: 190 newspapers were founded in the
two and a half years after the constitution was announced, according to
a recent count (Sa‘idi Sirjani 1993, pp. 208–12). And, as elsewhere, the
ruling intellectuals voiced a commitment to universal education, hoping
to build a public-school system from scratch (Arasteh 1969, pp. 223–30).
An Iranian poet suggested that the twin ideals of democracy and science
seemed somewhat loftier in principle than the reproduction of intellectuals
seemed in practice:
Constitution’s star shone to no avail;
The sun of science rose, but what did we gain?
In cities and towns you now want to base
Training centers, there teachers to raise. (Soroudi 1979, p. 34)
In sum, intellectuals were the prime beneficiaries of successful democ-
racy movements in the decade before World War I. They took whatever
state offices they were able to wrest from the old regime and acted swiftly
to pursue their hegemonic interests, a package that included educational
expansion, freedom of the press, public health reform, legal reform, and
other measures that benefited intellectuals directly (and the rest of society
indirectly).
This evidence dovetails with the previous sections to form a consistent
picture of an emerging class pursuing and attaining a collective goal. The
collective organization that intellectuals forged in the early 20th century
was entwined with prodemocracy movements. Other classes identified by
theorists as the social basis of democratization were latecomers to these
prodemocracy movements, if they played a role at all, and subordinated
7 We thank Qin Hua for translation assistance with this source.
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themselves to the intellectuals’ lead. These movements succeeded in coun-
tries where the intellectuals were most numerous. The intellectuals then
dominated the democratized portions of the state and pursued their heg-
emonic class interests. This varied evidence supports the contention that
intellectuals were central to democratization in the decade before World
War I.
INTELLECTUALS AND DEMOCRATIZATION, 1989–96
If the Russian revolution of 1905 sparked a wave of democratizations at
the beginning of the 20th century, the Soviet reforms of the late 1980s
sparked another wave of democratizations at the end of the century (Kurz-
man 1998b). From 1989 through 1996, several dozen countries underwent
democratization of varying degrees (Diamond 1999, pp. 24–25, 60). In the
second part of our analysis, we examine which nondemocracies in 1988
underwent democratization in the following eight years and explore class
and national factors associated with democratization in this period.8
Several case studies suggest that intellectuals played a significant role
in this wave of democratization. University groups formed the organi-
zational basis for the democracy movement in China (Cherrington 1991),
Côte d’Ivoire (Bailly 1995, pp. 109–20), and Nigeria (Williams 1998).
Educated professionals organized the Democratic Russia movement (Gar-
celon 1997), the New Forum and other prodemocracy groups in East
Germany (Torpey 1995, pp. 139ff.), and the antidictatorial referendum in
Chile (Puryear 1994). But it is not feasible to conduct comparable case
studies for all the countries in this wave of democratizations, so we turn
to quantitative analyses of the universe of nondemocracies in 1988.
Case Selection and Measures
Why only nondemocracies? Because we are interested in democratization,
the relevant cases are countries that are “at risk” of undergoing democ-
ratization. Most of the existing democracies have no room to move upward
on the democracy scales and, as a result, would receive democratization
ratings of zero—the same rating as nondemocracies that failed to de-
mocratize. This combination of high-democracy zeros and low-democracy
zeros would confound our findings. By contrast, limiting the sample to
8 Using an earlier baseline year—e.g., 1974, which Huntington (1991) takes as the
beginning of the “third wave” of democratizations—stretches the time-lag between
independent and dependent variables.
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nondemocracies in 1988 allows us to focus on democratization after 1988.9
It may well be the case that countries with large working classes, for
example, had already become democracies by 1988 and therefore are
excluded from our analysis. This finding would be fully consistent with
our approach, since we argue that different waves of democratization may
have different social bases. Yet we must leave the study of other waves
to future research and claim only that these data speak to the class basis
of democratization in 1989–96. A final note on sample selection: deter-
mining the universe of nondemocracies has the unfortunate side effect of
relying on a dichotomous conceptualization of democracy, which, follow-
ing Cutright (1963) and Bollen and Jackman (1989), we consider to be a
continuous variable. However, this disadvantage is mitigated by the bi-
modal distribution of democracy in 1988: there were relatively few semi-
democracies at that time, according to both of our democracy scales, to
complicate the dichotomization.
As in our quantitative analysis of the 1904–12 period, we measure
democracy by deferring to the judgment of two prominent democracy
scales, Polity IV and Polyarchy (for the construction of these scales, see
“Descriptive Statistics” above).10 Our sample of nondemocracies is as in-
clusive as possible, comprising countries identified by either scale as a
nondemocracy in 1988. These criteria generate a population of 94 non-
democratic independent countries.11 We also use the Polity IV and
Polyarchy scales to construct our dependent variable. For each scale, we
calculate a change score (Allison 1990): the maximum shift in each country
from 1988 to 1996.12 This shift represents the high-water mark of de-
9 This approach might be considered a pseudolongitudinal design, as contrasted with
typical cross-sectional analyses that take contemporaneous observations for the in-
dependent and dependent variables. A truly longitudinal approach, however, would
require multiple observations for each country, which we lack for many of our variables.
10 We opted not to use the Freedom House (1989–97) rating of political rights and civil
liberties, because it changed rating personnel in 1989, so that 1988 data cannot be
considered comparable to the data for later years (Gastil 1991, p. 45). Other time-series
measures of democracy developed by Alvarez et al. (1996) and Bollen (1998) end at
1990 and 1988, respectively.
11 We removed one country (East Germany) from the data set because it had merged
with a preexisting democracy by 1996. We omitted Lebanon because of its missing
values on both democracy scales throughout the period 1988–96. However, we kept
both North and South Yemen in the data set, despite their merger between 1988 and
1996, because both constituent countries were in the 1988 data set. We used the unified
Yemen score to construct the dependent variable for both countries.
12 For Czechoslovakia, which had split by 1996, we averaged the scores of the Czech
Republic and Slovakia to construct the dependent variable. For the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, we took the democracy scores of their primary successor (Russia, the rump
Yugoslavia). Other components of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are not included
in the sample for lack of comparable 1988 data.
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mocratization in each country during this period. As described in the
methods section below, our models use a latent dependent variable based
on these shifts.
Class Indicators
Our key explanatory variables represent four distinct social classes, which
we measure directly, unlike previous quantitative studies of the social
bases of democracy. We use indicators from 1988 or the latest previous
year for which data are available. The qualitative section of this article,
on the early 20th century, identified class consciousness and collective
mobilization as crucial factors in understanding the social basis of de-
mocratization. However, these factors are not readily captured in quan-
titative measures. The sole measure of collective mobilization that we
have been able to discover is a crude indicator of bourgeois self-organi-
zation. For the other classes in question, we focus on the social material
from which identity might emerge. This first foray into the subject there-
fore uses the best available data, namely indicators of classes “in them-
selves,” not classes “for themselves.” That is, with the exception of the
bourgeoisie, we estimate each class as a category, not as a cohesive or
self-conscious social group. This approach is commonplace in the cross-
national study of class, though this literature has not broached the rela-
tionship between class and democratization. The various schemas of the
Comparative Class Analysis Project (Wright 1997), the Cambridge Social
Interaction and Stratification Scale (Prandy 2000), and other projects (Er-
ikson and Goldthorpe 1993; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Ganze-
boom, Luijkx, and Treiman 1989; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995) priv-
ilege objective definitions of class position over subjective definitions of
class affiliation. Our approach is the same, though our measures are con-
siderably less sophisticated, sacrificing rigor and nuance in exchange for
a large sample size. The studies just mentioned examine only 35 countries
or fewer, with only a handful of cases outside of the wealthy industrialized
democracies. We trust that future work will develop improved measures
along the paths that we are only beginning to explore.
Bourgeoisie.—As a measure of the size and organization of the bour-
geoisie—the only one of our class indicators that takes organization into
account—we count the number of chambers of commerce listed for each
country in the World Directory of Chambers of Commerce (International
Chamber of Commerce 1985). Bourgeoisies may exist without founding
a chamber of commerce or registering it with the global association of
chambers of commerce, but we argue that such bourgeoisies are either
less developed, less organized, or nonisomorphic to international standards
and are therefore less likely, according to the theories developed in the
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qualitative literature, to mobilize on behalf of democracy. Countries with
two or more chambers listed are top-coded at “2” to correct for the far
greater detail of reporting in a handful of countries.
Middle class.—We adopt an economic definition of the middle class in
order to distinguish it from the intellectual class, which we consider sep-
arately. To measure the size of the middle class, we add the second and
third highest quintiles of income distribution: the higher the income share
of these quintiles, the more wealth is distributed to groups just outside
of the elite (proxied here by the top quintile). Our primary source for this
variable is the World Development Report (World Bank 1990 and various
other years), with additional information from Hoover (1989), Jazairy,
Alamgir, and Panuccio (1992, pp. 402–3), and World Bank (1998). Despite
the multiple sources, we are unable to find income distribution data for
44 countries in our sample.13
Working class.—To measure the size of the working class, we use the
percentage of the workforce in industry (United Nations 1991, pp. 150–
51). This measure fits well with Rueschemeyer et al.’s (1992) emphasis
on industrialization as the underlying process generating working-class
activism, referred to above and summarized by Tilly (1997, p. 210): “Not
capitalism itself, but proletarianization constitutes the crucial conditions
for democratization.” We also tested an indicator of working-class organ-
ization constructed by Abootalebi (1995) that is available for 62 countries
in our sample, though organization may reflect variation in legal and
political environments rather than characteristics of the working class
itself.
Intellectuals.—As in our consideration of the early 20th century, we
test two operationalizations of the size of the intellectual class, one an
absolute number and one a ratio of the adult population. The ratio is
drawn directly from Barro and Lee (1994): the percentage of the popu-
lation age 15 and above that has attained some higher education. The
absolute number of people who have attained some higher education,
expressed in millions, is calculated from Barro and Lee’s (1994) ratio
measure using population distribution data from the United Nations
(1989, pp. 274–578). We also test two alternative measures related to the
concentration of intellectuals in academic settings: a partial indicator of
collective organization, the number of scientific associations and learned
13 Because we use income quintiles for the middle-class variable, we did not use the
same data to construct an income-inequality variable, despite findings that inequality
is significantly correlated with democracy (Muller 1995; but see Bollen and Jackman
1995).
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societies in each country (World Guide 1990); and the number of higher-
education students in 1988 (UNESCO 1995).14
There is certain to be overlap among these four classes, since capitalists
can be educated, educated people may belong to the second or third
quintiles in income, and people in these quintiles may work in industry
(say, as managers). In theoretical terms, this poses no problem for our
analysis, since individuals may hold multiple identities and be counted
as a member of more than one group. And in practice, the overlap does
not appear to be so extensive as to confound the various measures. The
only significant bivariate correlation among these measures is between
two groups that seem unlikely to share members: intellectuals and working
class.
National-Level Characteristics
In addition to these class variables, which form the primary focus of our
study, we control for various national-level characteristics that have been
identified as important in the literature on democratization. We group
these independent variables into three categories: economic (variables 1–
2), social (variables 3–6), and political (variables 7–9) characteristics of
countries.
Economic Indicators
1. National wealth.—Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, measured
in U.S. dollars, is the single most commonly used predictor of democracy
in the quantitative literature. However, this variable is not available for
a dozen socialist countries in 1988 (Clements 1988; World Bank 1990;
Penn World Tables 1994). To maximize sample size and avoid sample-
selection bias, we use gross national product (GNP) per capita instead,
expressed here in thousands of U.S. dollars (World Bank 1990, supple-
mented by Jazairy et al. 1992, pp. 386–87). In any case, the reduced-
sample GDP figures are highly correlated with GNP (.90) and generate
results that are consistent with the GNP results reported here.
2. Economic performance.—To indicate whether the nondemocratic re-
gime in place in 1988 had “delivered” long-term economic growth, we use
14 Future research on this subject may wish to consider the possibility that some fields
of higher education are more associated with prodemocracy activism than others. We
have not been able to locate data that break down the prevalence of higher education
among adults by field of study. In addition, we recognize that intellectuals living abroad
may influence democratization in their countries of origin, but we are unable to estimate
the size or organization of this population.
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average annual growth in real per capita GNP, 1965–88. The sources for
this variable are the same as for national wealth.
Social Indicators
3. Population.—Several quantitative studies of democracy control for na-
tional population size (here expressed in millions), since small countries
may have an advantage over large countries in generating and main-
taining democracy (Dahl and Tufte 1973). This variable is drawn from
the Penn World Tables (1994), supplemented by various sources.
4. Literacy.—Literacy rates (measured as a percentage of the population
aged 15 and over [UNESCO 2002, supplemented by various sources]) are
a crude but commonly used measure of social development (Deutsch 1961).
We find the same results when literacy rates are replaced with the per-
centage of population age 15 and up in 1986–90 that has attained some
primary schooling (Barro and Lee 1994).
5. Life expectancy.—As a proxy for public health and a manifestation
of human development (UNDP 1990), we use Barro and Lee’s (1994)
measure of life expectancy for newborns in 1985. We also test an alter-
native measure, the mortality rate for newborns in 1985 (Barro and Lee
1994).
6. Protestantism.—Democracy in its contemporary form first emerged
within Christian contexts (De Gruchy 1995; Maddox 1996). More specif-
ically, several quantitative studies have found that Protestant countries
are more likely to be democratic than countries with other religious her-
itages (Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Iyall 1999; Lipset et al.
1993). We use the percentage of population that was Protestant (including
Anglican) in 1980, from Barrett (1982).
Political Indicators
7. British heritage.—Following Bollen and Jackman (1985), Crenshaw
(1995), and other scholars who report a significant positive relationship
between British colonial control and postcolonial democracy, we include
a variable indicating how many years, if any, a country had been a British
colony or protectorate (Truhart 1984–88).
8. Militarization.—Since we expect highly militarized states to be less
likely to democratize, we include a control variable measuring defense
spending as a proportion of a country’s gross national product (World
Bank 1998, supplemented by US ACDA 1989).
9. Democratic heritage.—On the premise that countries with a demo-
cratic background are more likely to be democratic, we include a control
variable measuring democratic heritage. We estimate this heritage by
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summing each country’s democracy score since independence (or the be-
ginning of the time series in 1800 and 1810, respectively), then dividing
this by the maximum possible democracy score in each scale. We calculate
this value separately for the Polity IV and Polyarchy data,15 and we
construct a latent variable combining both values.
Methods
There are two parts to our analysis. First, we analyze the data descrip-
tively. We divide the 94 nondemocracies into two groups: those that
reached the Polity IV and Polyarchy thresholds of democracy between
1989 and 1996, and those that did not. We use t-tests to examine the
differences between “democratizers” and “nondemocratizers” in terms of
class and national-level characteristics.
Second, we move to a multivariate framework to test whether the
differences between the democratizers and nondemocratizers hold when
the dichotomous distinction is abandoned in favor of a continuous de-
mocratization scale, and when we control statistically for national-level
characteristics. We employ structural equation modeling (SEM) tech-
niques using the AMOS statistical package. This approach has several
advantages over typical regression techniques. First, structural equation
modeling accords with our view that democracy is a latent variable that
is difficult to observe and most likely measured with error (Bollen 1993).
Indeed, our two indicators of democracy, POLITY and ID, though sig-
nificantly correlated—among nondemocracies, the bivariate correlations
are .51 for 1988, .77 for democratic heritage, .61 for the maximum shift
between 1988 and 1996—rely on two entirely different approaches to
measurement. We have no theoretical reason to discard either indicator,
and structural equation modeling allows us to include both measures in
the model rather than choose between them.16 Second, because of missing
values on several variables, we decided to use a direct, full-information,
maximum-likelihood method of estimation (Anderson 1957) that is avail-
able only in the AMOS software package. Thus, instead of imputing
values or deleting cases with incomplete information, we retain all cases
in the analysis, which is important given our small sample size. Third,
structural equation modeling allows us to estimate correlations among
the independent variables, thereby relaxing regression assumptions about
noncollinearity. For a graphical representation of our model, see figure 1.
15 As indicated in note 5: to calculate democratic heritage, we added 10 to all Polity
ratings, bringing negative values to 0 or above.
16 Both indicators are reliable: with the coefficient for POLITY constrained to 1, the
R2 for ID is 0.89.
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Fig. 1.—Structural equation model of democratization, 1989–96
For simplicity of presentation, we do not report the correlations among
independent variables, though all correlations are estimated in the re-
gression models.17
17 In addition, structural equation modeling allows us to model multiple causal paths
simultaneously, permitting us to examine whether class-level indicators mediate the
relationship between national-level characteristics and democratization. These models
produce consistently analogous results, but only 8 of 36 potential indirect-effect paths
are statistically significant—so on inductive grounds we do not report these findings.
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Descriptive Results
As in 1904, nondemocracies in 1988 were substantially less developed
than democracies. GNP per capita was more than six times higher in the
democracies, and almost all of the variables reported in table 3 show
significant differences in the expected directions. These findings confirm
the correlation between economic development and levels of democracy
noted above (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1993; Londregan and Poole 1996).
To reiterate, economic development also underlies all of the main class-
based theories of democratization and is associated with the rise of the
bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels 1978; Lenin 1975b; Moore 1966); the ex-
pansion of the working class (Therborn 1977; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992);
and the emergence of a middle class (Lipset 1959, 1993).
We therefore expect that the most economically developed of the non-
democracies would be most likely to undergo democratization soon there-
after. But when we move from a cross-section in 1988 to an examination
of democratization in 1989–96, the picture is not nearly so clear. Contrary
to expectations, there is no statistically significant difference in GNP per
capita between democratizers and nondemocratizers. The growth rate is
significantly lower, suggesting that economic stagnation or decline, not
economic gain, may be spurring the fall of autocracies. Contrary to ex-
pectations, democratizers have no greater British heritage—when this
variable is dichotomized, as is sometimes done in the democratization
literature, democratizers are significantly less likely to have been British
colonies or protectorates. Other national-level variables differ in the pre-
dicted directions, but the difference is only statistically significant for three
of them: literacy, Protestantism, and democratic heritage (Polity IV scale
only), all of which are positively correlated with democratization.
Two social classes appear to be related to democratization in this period:
the working class and intellectuals. All of the class variables differ in the
predicted, positive, direction, but the difference is statistically significant
only for the working class variable and the ratio of intellectuals to the
adult population. In the comparison of means for 1904–12, the absolute
number of intellectuals was significant and the ratio was not; for 1988–
96, the pattern is the reverse. While the nondemocracies with the largest
absolute number of higher-educated persons in 1904 participated unan-
imously in the ensuing wave of democratizations, only half of the top 10
in 1988 democratized by 1996. Of the two nondemocratic countries with
by far the most higher-educated persons in 1988—Russia and China, with
more than six and three times the number of the third-ranking country,
respectively—only one democratized in this wave. The cadre effect im-
plied by the significance of absolute numbers of intellectuals in the early
20th century was not evident in the late 20th century. Instead, the effect
TABLE 3
Correlates of Democratization, 1988–96
Independent Variable










GNP per capita (in 1,000 US$) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 8.2* 1.4 .8
GNP per capita growth 1965–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 2.1* 1.5 .5*
Social:
Population (in millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.3 46.9 33.5 26.2
Literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.8 86.8* 53.8 66.9*
Life expectancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.1 69.4* 56.2 58.9
Protestantism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6 26.2* 12.8 22.0*
Political:
British heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.5 45.1 37.6 30.8
Militarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 3.4* 6.9 5.3
Democratic heritage (Polity IV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.6 64.7* 21.6 28.1
Democratic heritage (Polyarchy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 22.4* 3.7 5.1
Classes:
Bourgeoisie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.05 1.70* 1.04 1.07
Middle class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.4 27.1* 23.9 24.9
Working class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.8 19.2* 13.5 17.7*
Intellectuals (absolute no., in millions) . . . . . . . . 1.1 4.3 .8 1.5
Intellectuals (ratio) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 12.1* 3.5 5.1
N countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 46 65 29
Note.—The term “democracies” is defined by both Polity IV (POLITY ≥ 6) and Polyarchy (ID ≥ 5) in 1988; the term “democratizers” is defined by
both scales above these thresholds simultaneously in at least one year, 1989–96. Independent variables use 1988 values. Significance tests refer to one-
tailed t-tests for comparison of means.
 P ! .10.
* P ! .05.
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of intellectuals seems to lie in their relative, not absolute, numbers; for
this reason, the rest of the analysis will focus primarily on the ratio of
intellectuals.
Multivariate Analysis
We estimate a series of structural equation models that test the effects of
class variables and national-level characteristics on democratization (see
table 4). Model 1 represents a traditionally specified model of democra-
tization with national-level characteristics—grouped into economic, po-
litical, and social indicators—as the only explanatory variables. These
results confirm certain findings in the literature on national-level predic-
tors of democratization: Protestantism appears to be associated with a
greater likelihood of democratization, and militarization appears to be
associated with a lesser likelihood. However, some of our results are not
consistent with previous studies. National wealth, the widely confirmed
correlate of democracy, is not significantly correlated with democratiza-
tion, either as GNP or GDP (substituted in models not reported here).18
Economic growth, population, literacy, life expectancy, British heritage,
and democratic heritage seem to be uncorrelated with democratization.19
Next, model 2 of table 4 adds all of the class variables except the
variable of key interest to us, intellectuals. We find that the coefficients
for two of three social classes—the middle class and the working class—
are statistically significant.20 The importance of including class indicators
is confirmed by the goodness of fit of models 1 and 2. The difference in
x2 values and degrees of freedom for the two models indicate that the
three social classes significantly improve the fit of model 1. In other words,
the model without the three class variables does not fit the empirical data
as well as the model that includes them.
Last, we add the variable representing the social class of key interest
to us: the ratio of intellectuals in the adult population (see model 3). This
variable has a statistically significant and positive effect on democrati-
zation. Moreover, it alters the traditionally specified relationship between
18 Lipset et al. (1993) report a nonlinear relationship between national wealth and
democracy. Cubic models, they argue, reflect the downturn in democracy as national
wealth rises through the middle levels of the international distribution, a moment
corresponding to the beginnings of capital-intensive industrialization (O’Donnell 1973).
We were unable to find a similar pattern in these data.
19 Infant mortality rate—an alternative, inverse measure of public health, not shown
in table 4—shows the same pattern as life expectancy. Primary school enrollment ratio,
swapped in for literacy in models not reported here, has no significant effect.
20 An alternative measure of working-class organization (Abootalebi 1995) has no sig-
nificant effect.
TABLE 4
Correlates of Democratization, 1988–96:
Direct Maximum-Likelihood Estimations
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Economic:





































































Intellectuals (ratio) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .a . . .a .822*
(.301)
for democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2R .288 .508 .676
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 94 94
df . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 26 25
(significance relative to previous model)2x 53.1 40.5* 32.5*
Note.—Dependent variable is maximum increase in democracy from 1988 to 1989–96; see fig. 1. SEs
are listed in parentheses.
a Constrained to zero.
 P ! .10.
* P ! .05.
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certain national level characteristics and democratization, raising life ex-
pectancy and British heritage to significance. Moreover, this model has
the highest R2 value of the three models (0.676). Further evidence of the
impact of intellectuals may be found in comparison of model fit: the x2
scores for model 3 (including intellectuals) show a significantly better fit
than both model 1 (excluding all class variables) and model 2 (excluding
intellectuals).21 In addition, intellectuals have a larger standardized co-
efficient than the other class variables (0.746; middle class p 0.556; work-
ing class p 0.426).
When we substitute alternative measures of intellectuals for the ratio
in the adult population, the effect is weaker. The absolute number of
intellectuals in 1988 is not significantly correlated with democratization
in 1989–96. Neither is the number of higher-education students in each
country in 1988, suggesting that educated young people are no more
important for democratization than older educated people.22 The only
alternative measure that is correlated with democratization is the number
of scientific associations in each country in 1988—a crude measure of the
collective organization of certain intellectuals, though scientists are a small
subset of the category. The higher-education ratio is the only measure of
intellectuals that generates a statistically significant improvement in fit
over model 2.
DISCUSSION
Intellectuals mattered for democratization in two 20th-century waves of
democratization. We present several forms of evidence for an early 20th-
century wave, 1905–12: nondemocratic countries with more intellectuals
were more likely to undergo democratization than those with fewer in-
tellectuals; the intellectuals’ collective organizations provided the back-
bone for the prodemocracy movements; other classes, such as the bour-
21 These findings are partially replicated in ordinary least squares models. The intel-
lectuals ratio is significantly associated with democratization—using either the Polity
IV or Polyarchy indicators as the dependent variable—even when controlling for the
other variables listed in table 4. The middle class is significantly associated with
democratization as measured by the Polyarchy scale but not the Polity IV scale. How-
ever, missing data reduced the sample size to fewer than half of the 94 non-
democracies in the SEM models, so we do not report these findings.
22 As confirmation of this finding, we also found that educational expansion had no
effect on democratization. To proxy educational expansion in each country, we plotted
a line for the number of higher-education students in various years between 1960 and
1988 (from various issues of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook), then included the
slope of this line in model 3 along with the current number of higher-education students.
The slope had a negative coefficient but was not significant. The same noneffect
emerged for the slope of the higher-education ratio.
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geoisie and working class, either failed to support democratization or
accepted the intellectuals’ leadership; and the intellectuals benefited dis-
proportionately from democratization. All of these forms of evidence com-
bine to suggest that intellectuals constituted the class basis of democra-
tization during this period.
Skipping ahead to the end of the 20th century, we present quantitative
evidence for 94 countries that were nondemocratic in 1988. Structural
equation models combining national-level and class-level variables find
that countries with a greater ratio of intellectuals in the population were
more likely to democratize in the ensuing eight years than countries with
lower ratios. Whether or not intellectuals existed as a cohesive social group
at this time, higher education appears to be associated with
democratization.
In addition, these models find that the size of the working class and
the middle class are correlated with democratization, confirming the value
of including class indicators in cross-national quantitative research on this
subject. The bourgeoisie appears to have no significant effect, but this
may be due to the insensitivity of the measure, the number of chambers
of commerce in each country, which is limited to values of 0, 1, or 2. In
standardized terms, intellectuals have a larger coefficient than the other
classes, suggesting that democratization may be more sensitive to changes
in higher education than to changes in other classes.
Despite having found significant class effects on democratization, we
do not wish to espouse some sort of lockstep threshold theory of prereq-
uisites for democracy. Such theories fell out of favor in the last generation
as they came to be perceived as “too deterministic for our taste” (Prze-
worski 1997, p. 6), and a large portion of the literature on democratization
has shifted away from prerequisites and toward process (Rustow 1970;
Di Palma 1990, pp. 4–7; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Pagnucco 1995), with
case studies on countries such as Paraguay (Arditi 1995) and Mongolia
(Fish 1998) that have undergone democratization in the absence of the
usual set of expected prerequisites (Kurzman 1998a). While leaving room
for contingency, we find patterns of significant correlation that suggest
an elective affinity between the size of the intellectual class and the like-
lihood of democratization.
This elective affinity may be time-specific. The early 20th-century link
was based primarily on the organizational mobilization of self-identified
intellectuals; for the late 20th century, we note the importance of the
presence (rather than mobilization) of other-identified (rather than self-
identified) intellectuals. In other words, the ratio of highly educated people
(whether or not they self-identify as intellectuals, which we cannot mea-
sure) comes to matter more than the mobilization of self-identified intel-
lectuals (whether or not they are highly educated). Our only indicator of
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intellectual organization in the late 20th century—the number of scientific
associations, which captures only one portion of the educated popula-
tion—has no significant effect on democratization. For the later period,
then, democratization is associated with intellectuals as a sort of class-in-
itself; for the earlier period, it is associated with intellectuals both as class-
in-itself (the bivariate data on absolute number of secondary education
students) and as class-for-itself. This discrepancy may be an artifact of
our methodology, since we have no measure of intellectual self-identifi-
cation to test the class-for-itself argument in the late 20th century, and
too few cases for multivariate analysis to test the class-in-itself argument
in the early 20th century. The discrepancy may also be due, we propose,
to changes in the intellectual class. At different periods, it may conceive
of itself in different terms or refuse to conceive of itself as a collective
entity at all.
Data limitations prevent us from testing our full quantitative model
for intervening periods. However, we are able to offer preliminary evi-
dence that the relationship between intellectuals and democratization
holds for other years in the post–World War II period. As shown in table
5, intellectuals are significantly more prevalent in democracies than in
nondemocracies for each year covered in the Barro and Lee education
data set, beginning in 1960. In addition, they were significantly more
prevalent in nondemocracies that democratized over the ensuing eight
years than in nondemocracies that did not (using an eight-year window
in order to be consistent with tables 2 and 3).
By way of illustration, we conclude with suggestive evidence from the
years after the early 20th-century wave of democratizations, when intel-
lectuals underwent a dramatic demobilization and disaffiliation with their
intellectual group identity. By this time, the emerging democratic insti-
tutions discussed in the first half of this paper had been undermined by
monarchs or generals. The failure of these new democracies harmed the
intellectuals. Their newspapers were closed, their parties were driven from
parliament, their state sinecures were purged, and many were driven into
exile. The new authoritarians adopted parts of the intellectuals’ hegemonic
ideology—mass education and public health reform, for example—but
without the former hegemons, who were incorporated selectively and only
in subordinate roles (Kurzman 2003).
The intellectuals plunged into despair, and themes of hopeless bleakness
emerged in the literatures of all of these countries in the wake of failed
democracy. A prodemocracy poet in Iran lamented, “This ruined grave-
yard is not Iran. This desolate place is not Iran; where is Iran?” (Soroudi
1979, p. 258). An Ottoman author opined: “My friend, sometimes the
environment is like a bad omen, like a graveyard. What intelligence, what



















1960 . . . . . . . 6.8 13.7* 5.3 10.6*
1965 . . . . . . . 5.9 13.2* 4.7 9.1*
1970 . . . . . . . 5.6 13.9* 4.7 7.4*
1975 . . . . . . . 5.5 12.7* 4.9 7.4*
1980 . . . . . . . 5.8 11.2* 4.3 9.6*
1985 . . . . . . . 5.6 11.8* 4.2 8.0*
Note.—The term “democracies” is defined by both Polity IV (POLITY ≥ 6) and Polarchy (ID ≥ 5);
the term “democratizers” is defined by both scales above these thresholds simultaneously in at least one
of the ensuing eight years. Significance levels refer to one-tailed t-test for comparison of means.
* P ! .05.
known Mexican novelist came to the “basic conviction that the fight is a
hopeless one and a thorough waste” (Rutherford 1971, p. 89). In Portugal,
the journal School Federation warned, “Black days await us. Days of
hunger threaten us. Days of slavery await us” (Mónica 1978, p. 179). In
Russia, a leading poet worried: “Already, as in a nightmare or a frightening
dream, we can imagine that the darkness overhanging us is the shaggy
chest of the shaft-horse, and that in another moment the heavy hoofs will
descend” (Blok [1908] 1966, p. 363). A Chinese writer offered this extreme
metaphor:
Imagine an iron house having not a single window, and virtually indestruc-
tible, with all its inmates sound asleep and about to die of suffocation.
Dying in their sleep, they won’t feel the pain of death. Now if you raise a
shout to awake a few of the light sleepers, making these unfortunate few
suffer the agony of irrevocable death, do you really think you are doing
them a good turn? (quoted in Schwarcz 1986, p. 13)
With their class mobilization in ruins, intellectuals began to criticize
the collective identity of “intellectual.” In Russia, a widely noted book of
essays berated the intellectuals’ class mobilization (Read 1979; Shatz and
Zimmerman 1994). In the Ottoman Empire, a popular pamphlet de-
nounced the prodemocracy intellectuals for aping the West (Atis 1995, pp.
250–52). In Iran, prodemocracy intellectuals were mocked as “national
goody-goodies” (Katouzian 1979, p. 544). In China, leftist intellectuals
adopted the slogan “Down with the intellectual class” (Schwarcz 1986, p.
186). Ironically, it was at this time that a handful of activists, recognizing
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that “the class of intellectuals” had become “disinherited,” tried to establish
an international organization to promote their identity and represent their
interests (Lévy 1931, p. 6).
The decline of the intellectuals’ collective identity during this period
corresponded with their reluctance to pursue prodemocracy movements.
In place of collective mobilization for democracy, intellectuals scattered,
“looking for new gods” (Shanin 1986, p. 208). If some intellectuals served
in interwar governments, they no longer ruled in their own name but
rather in the name of the socialist working class, the nationalist bour-
geoisie, or the fascist fatherland—the diversity of camps that Mannheim
observed. Democracy during this period, then, was the result of other
forces than the collective action of intellectuals.
This shift implies that the social basis of democratization may change
over time. If the intellectuals were central in the early 20th century but
not in subsequent decades, then democratizations of this period must have
had other champions. This suggests that causal explanations of democ-
ratization may need to be cautious about generalizing across time: rather
than search for a generalized association between certain social classes
and certain political configurations, the analysis of democratization may
be forced to limit itself to time-specific contexts. But that is the maximal
implication of this study. The minimal implication is that intellectuals
sometimes matter for democratization, as for instance in the beginning
and end of the 20th century. How they matter may have changed over
the course of the century, but they—and other classes—deserve systematic
attention in the literature on democratization.
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Hanioǧlu, M. Şükrü. 1995. The Young Turks in Opposition. New York: Oxford
University Press.
———. 2001. Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908. New York:
Oxford University Press.




Hayek, Friedrich. 1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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